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This paper reports on an investigation of Russian noncompliance with nuclear arms 
control agreements.  It discusses three examples: the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives in 
1991-1992, particularly with respect to non-strategic nuclear forces; the Budapest 
Memorandum concluded with Ukraine in 1994; and the 1987 Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.  The paper considers possible explanations for Russian 
noncompliance with the INF Treaty, including financial and strategic advantages in 
developing and testing intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).  
The paper examines the prospects for Russia’s acknowledgment of its violation and 




This study focuses on Russian violations of nuclear arms control agreements. The United 
States is confronted with two types of violations of such agreements.  One type (as with 
the Budapest Memorandum) is open and clear. Russia’s noncompliance has damaged the 
cause of nuclear non-proliferation around the world.  The other type of violation is 
covert; a violator of an arms control treaty usually engages in subterfuge in order to 
achieve a unilateral advantage.  As Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld stated in their 
Congressional testimony regarding the INF Treaty, the United States “will not allow the 
Russian Federation to gain a significant military advantage through their violation of an 
arms control treaty. We are developing and analyzing response options for the President, 
and will consult with our Allies.”1  The goal of this study is to contribute to this process 
by clarifying the probable motivations of Russia in violating arms control agreements, 
and, on the basis of this knowledge, assessing possible responses to violations.  
Before offering an analysis of Russia’s possible motives in violating the INF Treaty, this 
paper considers Moscow’s failure to honor two other nuclear arms control agreements — 
the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) in 1991-1992, particularly with respect to non-
strategic nuclear forces; and the Budapest Memorandum concluded with Ukraine in 1994. 
 
Findings and Conclusions (to include Process) 
 
The paper devotes most attention to the INF Treaty.  It considers how the political 
context in Russia under Putin’s rule has become increasingly skeptical about the benefits 
for Russia of agreements concluded with the United States and other NATO nations by 
                                               
1 Statement Of Robert Work, Deputy Secretary Of Defense, And Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice 
Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff, Before The House Committee On Armed Services, June 
25, 2015, p. 4. 
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Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet president, and Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the 
Russian Federation.  Russian critics of these agreements, including the 1990 Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), have described them as the 
products of “weak” presidents who allowed the United States and other Western 
countries to take advantage of post-Soviet Russia’s weakness and desire for 
reconciliation with the West.   
 
The paper also considers possible explanations for Russian noncompliance with the INF 
Treaty, including financial and strategic advantages in developing and testing 
intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs).  Above all, the platforms 
for GLCMs are much cheaper and more survivable than the ships and aircraft that could 
be used to deliver sea- and air-launched cruise missiles; and the defenses of the United 
States and the other NATO Allies against cruise missiles are rudimentary at best. 
The paper next examines the prospects for Russia’s acknowledgment of its violation and 
return to compliance with the INF Treaty.  It concludes that these prospects are poor, in 
the light of (a) the history of Soviet and Russian behavior concerning cases of 
noncompliance with arms control agreements and (b) the prevailing political dynamics in 
Russia.   
 
The paper then reviews possible U.S. responses to Russian violations of the INF Treaty.   
The development of active defenses against intermediate-range cruise missiles would be 
costly and technically challenging but advantageous in light of the proliferation of cruise 
missiles among potential adversaries in addition to Russia.   
The procurement of enhanced counterforce capabilities to neutralize intermediate-range 
ground-launched cruise missiles would also be expensive and technically demanding, 
given long-standing target acquisition problems; and such capabilities could present 
political and practical challenges in escalation control.  As with improved active 
defenses, however, enhanced counterforce capabilities could be relevant and useful in 
non-Russian contingencies. 
 
The concept of developing new U.S. “countervailing strike capabilities” as a possible 
response to intermediate-range Russian GLCMs has yet to be defined publicly with 
precision, but it could take various forms without violating the INF Treaty — for 
example, increasing the range and number of U.S. sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. 
The idea of deploying U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons to additional NATO nations in 
Europe has little support among the Allies, partly because it would be inconsistent with 
the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and partly because of other political and cost 
considerations.  The NATO Allies generally regard the sustainment and modernization of 
the Alliance’s current nuclear posture, based primarily on the triad of U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces and complemented by U.S. B-61 gravity bombs and U.S. and allied dual 
capable aircraft in Europe, as the fundamental priority in the nuclear domain.  The Allies 
support the pursuit of the B-61 life extension program and the renewal of the U.S. and 
Allied dual capable aircraft involved in the Alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. 
The pursuit of a symmetrical U.S. response-in-kind to the Russian violation — for 
instance, developing and testing an intermediate-range GLCM or ground-launched 
ballistic missile — would delight the Russians, who have for years made clear their 
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interest in terminating the INF Treaty.  This approach might in public perceptions put 
most of the political blame and discredit for ending this arms control regime on the 
shoulders of the United States, even if Washington protested accurately that Moscow had 
first broken with the INF Treaty.  The idea that a U.S. initiative to develop and deploy 
ground-based intermediate-range missiles would enable the Alliance to repeat the 
experience with its double-track decision in the late 1970s and early 1980s — and 
thereby bring Russia back into compliance with the INF Treaty — overlooks the 
fundamental differences in the political circumstances in that period and the present. 
A more imaginative approach would be to place pressure on the Russians via focused 
technology-denial programs.  These programs could be targeted to limit Russia’s capacity 
to obtain essential electronic components for the GLONASS guidance system for 
intermediate-range cruise missiles. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 
The armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine has highlighted the Kremlin’s growing 
reliance on nuclear weapons as a practical instrument of national security.  For the last 
several years, Russia has actively used elements of its strategic nuclear triad to send 
signals to the United States and other NATO members, as well as to Japan.  Russia has 
also embarked on a massive modernization of its nuclear forces.  
This proposed study will address the following questions: how likely will the Russians be 
to use nuclear weapons in a crisis? What do Russian policies and behavior imply for 
long-standing U.S. assumptions about the requirements for deterrence and escalation 
control? What should be the U.S. policy in response to these changes in the Russian force 
posture and conduct?  What role should the U.S. Navy play in such a response?  What 
policy revisions should the United States recommend to its NATO Allies and other 
security partners?  To what extent should Alliance plans concerning air and ballistic 
missile defenses and other capabilities be revised in light of Russian behavior? 
 
